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Abstract The occasional occurrence of bivalent stimuli,
that is, stimuli with features relevant to two tasks, slows
performance on subsequent tasks with univalent stimuli,
including those which have no common features with
bivalent stimuli (i.e., the ‘‘bivalency effect’’). We have
suggested that the bivalency effect might stem from an
episodic context binding arising from the occasional
occurrence of bivalent stimuli. However, as the same
response set is used usually for univalent and bivalent
stimuli, bivalent stimulus features may be negatively
primed via response features. We investigated this possi-
bility in two experiments, in which one group of partici-
pants used the same response keys for all tasks and another
group used separate response keys. The results showed a
comparable bivalency effect in both groups. Thus, it rather
results from episodic context binding than from response
set priming.
Introduction
Performance in response to bivalent stimuli, i.e., stimuli
with features relevant to two different tasks, is slowed
compared to univalent stimuli (e.g., Jersild, 1927; Meiran,
2008; Steinhauser & Hu¨bner, 2009). Even when only a few
bivalent stimuli are presented among tasks with univalent
stimuli, performance is also slowed on subsequent univa-
lent trials. Moreover, this slowing, coined the bivalency
effect, occurs for tasks with univalent stimuli that share
relevant stimulus features with bivalent stimuli as well as
for tasks with univalent stimuli that share no relevant
stimulus features with bivalent stimuli (Meier, Woodward,
Rey-Mermet, & Graf, 2009; Rogers & Monsell, 1995;
Woodward, Meier, Tipper, & Graf, 2003; Woodward,
Metzak, Meier, & Holroyd, 2008; Wylie & Allport, 2000).
We have suggested that the bivalency effect might stem
from an episodic context binding arising from the occa-
sional occurrence of bivalent stimuli (Meier et al., 2009).
However, as we have investigated the bivalency effect only
with the same response features for all univalent and
bivalent stimuli, bivalent stimulus features might still
interfere with the processing of univalent trials that share
relevant response features with the bivalent stimuli
(Hommel, 2004; Metzker & Dreisbach, 2009). Thus,
bivalent stimulus features would be negatively primed over
these trials. This would slow performance and result in the
bivalency effect. The purpose of the present study was to
test whether the bivalency effect might result from this
kind of negative response set priming.
In the previous studies investigating the bivalency effect
(Meier et al., 2009; Woodward et al., 2003; 2008), par-
ticipants were asked to perform three binary tasks in a
given order, such as a parity decision (odd vs. even
numerals), a colour decision (red vs. blue shapes), and a
case decision (uppercase vs. lowercase letters). Most
stimuli were univalent (i.e., black numerals for the parity
decision, coloured shapes for the colour decision, and black
letters for the case decision). However, on a few trials of
one task, the stimuli were made bivalent (e.g., by pre-
senting the letters for the case decisions in either blue or
red print colour). The results consistently showed a per-
formance slowing for all tasks following bivalent stimuli,
including those with stimuli that shared no relevant stim-
ulus features with the bivalent stimuli (i.e., the parity
decisions). This finding—the bivalency effect—is robust,
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occurring with different types of tasks (parity, colour, case,
size, vowel/consonant), with different types of bivalent
stimuli (coloured or large/small letters) and with different
modalities (visual, auditory), and it is enduring (lasting
more than 20 s after a bivalent stimulus; Meier et al.
(2009)). Furthermore, in a study using functional magnetic
resonance (Woodward et al., 2008), the bivalency effect
was associated with activation in the dorsal anterior cin-
gulate cortex (dACC), a brain area recruited for the
adjustment of cognitive control (Botvinick, Braver, Barch,
Carter, & Cohen, 2001).
Together, these studies suggest that the bivalency effect
reflects a robust adjustment of cognitive control, which is
recruited to fine-tune performance according to the occa-
sional occurrence of bivalent stimuli. This cognitive con-
trol effect challenges current task-switching theories as
well as theories of cognitive control that focus primarily on
processes operating across stimulus and task representa-
tions. For instance, Allport et al. (Allport, Styles, & Hsieh,
1994; Allport & Wylie, 1999; 2000; Wylie & Allport,
2000) proposed a negative priming account in which
bivalent stimulus features led to the persisting suppression
or inhibition of the previously active task-set. In the
bivalency effect paradigm outlined above, it would mean
that bivalent stimulus features interfere with the processing
of the univalent trials that share relevant stimulus features
with the bivalent stimuli. Thus, bivalent stimulus features
would be inhibited and negatively primed. For example,
when coloured letters—the bivalent stimuli—are encoun-
tered in case decisions, the particular stimulus features (i.e.,
case and colour) would be bound together. When the col-
our decision is encountered later, the colour feature would
automatically activate the case feature. The irrelevant
activation of these stimulus features interferes with trial
processing and slows down performance on the colour
decision. Similarly, when the case decision is encountered,
the colour feature is also activated. Accordingly, a negative
priming account can explain the slowing that was found on
tasks with univalent stimuli sharing relevant stimulus fea-
tures with the bivalent stimuli (i.e., the colour and case
decisions). However, it cannot explain slowing that was
found on tasks with univalent stimuli sharing no relevant
stimulus features with the bivalent stimuli (i.e., the parity
decision).
Similarly, according to a task-decision process account,
those univalent stimuli which share stimulus features with
the bivalent stimuli, might require a task-decision process
(Braverman & Meiran, 2010; see also Fagot, 1994; Meiran,
Kessler, & Adi-Japha, 2008; Monsell, Yeung, & Azuma,
2000; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Rubinstein, Meyer, &
Evans, 2001; Sohn & Anderson, 2001). More precisely,
they might cue the irrelevant task and thus would slow
down the task-decision process. For example, when
bivalent stimuli are coloured letters, the stimuli for the
colour decision would also cue the case decision.
Accordingly, an additional process would be required to
resolve this ambiguity and to select the colour decision as
relevant. Similarly, the stimuli for the case decision might
cue the colour decision and accordingly, an additional
process would be required to select the case decision as
relevant. In contrast, for the univalent stimuli that share no
relevant stimulus features with the bivalent stimuli, such as
for the univalent stimuli on the parity decision, there is no
ambiguity with regard to the task to be performed. Thus, no
additional task-decision process would be required. Similar
to a negative-priming account, a task-decision account can
explain the slowing on tasks with univalent stimuli sharing
relevant stimulus features with the bivalent stimuli. How-
ever, it cannot explain the slowing on tasks with univalent
stimuli sharing no relevant stimulus features with the
bivalent stimuli.
Thus, to account for the bivalency effect, we have
proposed a different explanation (Meier et al., 2009) which
is based on the notion that a stimulus acquires a history
during an experiment, i.e., it acquires an association with
the task in which it occurs (see Waszak, Hommel, &
Allport, 2003). If episodic binding is not only specific to
stimuli and tasks, but also extends to the context in which
they occur (i.e., among purely univalent stimuli or among
univalent stimuli and occasionally occurring bivalent
stimuli), univalent stimuli and tasks might be bound to the
more demanding context created by bivalent stimuli. This
‘‘episodic context binding’’ interferes with task perfor-
mance, irrespective of whether univalent stimuli share or
do not share relevant features with the bivalent stimuli,
thus resulting in slower performance for all subsequent
univalent trials (i.e., the bivalency effect). According to
this explanation, the bivalency effect is the result of
interference caused by ‘‘episodic context binding’’.
However, recently an alternative explanation has
emerged. Based on the theoretical approach that stimulus
and response are represented similarly and thus might
prime each other (see Hommel, Mu¨sseler, Aschersleben,
& Prinz, 2001), some studies have shown priming from
response features to stimulus features (e.g., Deubel &
Schneider, 1996; Fagioli, Hommel, & Schubotz, 2007;
Kunde & Kiesel, 2006; Metzker & Dreisbach, 2009;
Paprotta, Deubel, & Schneider, 1999; see Hommel, 2004,
for an overview). For instance, Fagioli et al. (2007)
reported that when participants prepared a grasping
response, they better detected deviants according to their
size than according to their location. Conversely, when
participants prepared a reaching response, they better
detected deviants according to their location than
according to their size. Therefore, preparation for a
grasping response primed the stimulus features of size and
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preparation for a reaching response primed the stimulus
features of location, but not vice versa. This suggests that
the activation of response features facilitated the percep-
tion of stimulus features, thus providing empirical evi-
dence for priming from response features to stimulus
features. A similar conclusion has been reached by
Metzker and Dreisbach (2009). They investigated the
Simon effect, that is, the performance slowing that occurs
when the stimulus position, which is irrelevant for the
response, does or does not correspond to the response
position. In this study, participants were tested under two
instruction conditions. In one condition, the many-to-one
mapping condition, they were instructed to respond on the
basis of stimulus–response mappings, that is, they were
asked to respond to each stimulus with a corresponding
response key. In contrast, in the one-to-one mapping
condition they were instructed to respond according to a
categorization rule. For example, when the name of the
presented stimulus started with the letter B, the response
was a right key; when it did not start with B, the response
was a left key. The results showed a reduced Simon effect
when participants responded on the basis of stimulus–
response mappings (many-to-one mapping) compared to
the categorization rule (one-to-one mapping). Metzker and
Dreisbach (2009) concluded that when a response is
mapped to a stimulus according to a categorization rule
(one-to-one mapping), the response features strongly
prime one single stimulus feature, which results in the
Simon effect. In contrast, when a response is directly
mapped to several stimuli (many-to-one mapping), the
response features prime the stimulus features of several
stimuli. As a consequence, the stimulus feature of the
relevant stimulus is primed to a smaller degree, thereby
reducing the Simon effect. Thus, this study revealed a
bidirectional link between stimulus and response features,
supporting the view of priming from the response features
to stimulus features.
Priming from response features to stimulus features is of
particular interest for the bivalency effect as typically, the
response features have been identical for all univalent and
bivalent stimuli. Based on the evidence that priming can
extend from response features to stimulus features (e.g.,
Deubel & Schneider, 1996; Fagioli et al., 2007; Kunde &
Kiesel, 2006; Metzker & Dreisbach, 2009; Paprotta et al.,
1999; see Hommel, 2004), it is possible that the response
features of univalent stimuli may automatically activate
bivalent stimulus features. As a consequence, bivalent
stimulus features would have to be inhibited. This inhibi-
tion may slow down performance and thus causes the
bivalency effect. According to this explanation, the biva-
lency effect would result from negative priming of bivalent
stimulus features via common response features and there
would be no need for an explanation in terms of episodic
context binding.
The purpose of the present study was to test whether
the bivalency effect might result from negative priming
of bivalent stimulus features via the response features.
To do so, we adapted the paradigm used in the previous
studies by systematically varying the overlap of the
response sets. During three blocks, participants per-
formed a parity decision on numerals, a colour decision
on symbols, and a case decision on letters. Half of the
participants used an overlapping response set (i.e., the
same two keys for all three tasks), the other half a non-
overlapping response set (i.e., two different keys for each
of the three tasks). In the first and third blocks (the
purely univalent blocks), all stimuli were univalent. In
the second block (the mixed block), some letters for the
case decisions appeared coloured which turned them into
bivalent stimuli. Stimuli of this kind were evenly dis-
tributed across the case decisions.
We hypothesized that if the bivalency effect results
from negative priming of bivalent stimulus features via
response features (e.g., Fagioli et al., 2007; Metzker &
Dreisbach, 2009; see also Hommel, 2004; Hommel
et al., 2001), then it would have a differential impact on
the three tasks in the non-overlapping response set rel-
ative to the overlapping response set. More precisely,
when an overlapping response set is used, the response
features are identical for univalent and bivalent stimuli.
Thus, the response features of all univalent stimuli
would activate the bivalent stimulus features. Conse-
quently, bivalent stimulus features should be inhibited
for all univalent stimuli. In this case, performance
should be slowed down for all three tasks—replicating
the previous results. In contrast, when a non-overlapping
response set is used, the response features are identical
for univalent and bivalent stimuli in the task in which
the bivalent stimuli appear (i.e., the case decision).
Thus, the response features would activate the bivalent
stimulus features, but only for the case decision.
Accordingly, bivalent stimulus features should be
inhibited for the case decision and performance should
be slowed down for this task only. Alternatively, if the
bivalency effect reflects the interference due to episodic
context binding (Meier et al., 2009) then univalent
stimuli and tasks would be bound to the context that
arises from the occasional occurrence of bivalent stim-
uli. This episodic binding would interfere with perfor-
mance, irrespective of whether the univalent stimuli
share or do not share relevant response features with the
bivalent stimuli. According to this explanation, perfor-
mance should be slowed down for all three tasks inde-
pendent of the response set.





The participants were 40 volunteers (16 men, mean
age = 23.2, SD = 2.8) from the University of Bern. Half
of them were randomly assigned to the overlapping
response set condition and the other half to the non-over-
lapping response set condition. The study was approved by
the local ethical committee of the University of Bern.
Materials
For the parity decision, the stimuli were the numerals one
through eight, each displayed in black. For the colour
decision, the stimuli were the symbols §, %, *, #, displayed
either in blue or red. For the case decision, the stimuli were
the consonants d, f, r, t, displayed in black, in either upper-
or lowercase. We created a set of eight incongruent biva-
lent stimuli by presenting the same four consonants (d, f, r,
t) either in blue or red and either in upper- or lowercase. All
stimuli were displayed at the centre of the computer screen
in a 60-point Times New Roman font.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually. They were informed
that the experiment involved three different tasks: parity
decisions about numerals, colour decisions about symbols,
and case decisions about letters. Participants with an
overlapping response set were instructed to press the keys
b or n with their left and right index fingers, respectively,
for each of the three tasks. Participants with a non-
overlapping response set were instructed to press the keys
b or n with their left and right index fingers, respectively,
for the parity decision; the keys v or m with their left and
right middle fingers, respectively, for the colour decision;
the keys c or , with their left and right ring fingers,
respectively, for the case decision. The mapping informa-
tion, printed on paper, was displayed below the computer
screen throughout the experiment. Participants were further
informed that, for some of the case decisions, the letters
would be presented in colour. They were specifically
instructed to ignore colour information and to focus on
making case decisions.
After these instructions, a block of 30 trial sequences
was presented for practice. Each trial sequence required
making a parity decision, a colour decision, and a case
decision, always in the same order, as illustrated in Fig. 1.
The stimulus for each trial was randomly determined and
displayed until the participant responded. Then, the screen
blanked for 500 ms, and then the next stimulus appeared.
After each trial sequence, an additional blank interval of
500 ms was included. After the practice block and a brief
break, each participant completed three experimental
blocks without any break between blocks. The first block
included 32 trial sequences, with the first two trial
sequences serving as ‘‘warm-up’’ sequences which were
discarded from the analyses. The second and third blocks
had only 30 trial sequences each.
For the first and third blocks (the purely univalent blocks),
only univalent stimuli were presented. For the second block
(the mixed block), stimuli were univalent, except on 20% of
the case decisions in which bivalent stimuli (i.e., coloured
letters) appeared. Bivalent stimuli were determined randomly
and without replacement. Trial sequences with bivalent
stimuli were evenly interspersed among the 30 trial sequences
of the block; occurring in every fifth trial sequence,
Fig. 1 Experiment 1. Example
of two consecutive univalent
trial sequences. A univalent trial
sequence required making a
parity decision about numerals,
a colour decision about symbols
(the symbol % was written in
red and the symbol # was
written in blue), and a case
decision about letters. On a
bivalent trial sequence (not
pictured here), the letters were
presented in colour (either in
blue or red)
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specifically in the 3rd, 8th, 13th, 18th, 23th, and 28th
sequences. The entire experiment lasted about 15 min.
Data analysis
For each participant, the error rates and the median deci-
sion times (DTs) for correct responses were computed for
each task and each block. For the mixed block, error rates
and median DTs for univalent and bivalent case decisions
were computed separately. To account for general training
effects, we averaged the data from the purely univalent
blocks one and three for each task. An alpha level of 0.05
was used for all statistical tests. Greenhouse–Geisser cor-
rections are reported where appropriate and effect sizes are
expressed as partial g2 values.
Results
Performance on bivalent stimuli
As expected, participants made bivalent case decisions more
slowly than univalent case decisions in both response set
conditions (overlapping response set: Mbivalent = 1,151 ms,
SE = 113; Munivalent = 751 ms, SE = 50; and non-over-
lapping response set: Mbivalent = 1,101 ms, SE = 141;
Munivalent = 830 ms, SE = 98). This observation was borne
out by a two-factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the
case DTs from the mixed block. This ANOVA with stimulus
valence (univalent case, bivalent case) as a within-subject
factor and response set (overlapping, non-overlapping) as a
between-subjects factor showed a significant main effect of
stimulus valence, F (1, 38) = 34.26, p \ 0.001, g2 = 0.47,
but no other significant main or interaction effects,
Fs \ 1.26, ps [ .05, g2 \ 0.03.
The same ANOVA on the accuracy of the case decisions
from the mixed block revealed a significant main effect of
stimulus valence, F (1, 38) = 18.11, p \ 0.001, g2 = 0.32,
and a significant interaction between stimulus valence and
response set, F (1, 38) = 6.40, p \ 0.05, g2 = 0.14. The
main effect of response set was not significant, F (1,
38) = 0.65, p = 0.42, g2 = 0.02. This indicates that partic-
ipants made more errors on bivalent case decisions than on
univalent case decisions, but this difference was more pro-
nounced for the overlapping response set condition than for
the non-overlapping response set condition (overlapping
response set: Mbivalent = 0.87, SE = 0.03; Munivalent = 0.99,
SE \ 0.01; and non-overlapping response set: Mbivalent =
0.93, SE = 0.02; Munivalent = 0.96, SE = 0.01).
Performance on univalent stimuli
Figure 2 depicts the means of the median DTs on univalent
stimuli with the associated standard errors. Our main
objective was to examine the presence of the bivalency
effect in the different tasks across both response set con-
ditions. For this purpose, we carried out a mixed three-
factorial ANOVA on the DTs of univalent stimuli, with
block (purely univalent, mixed) and task (parity, colour,
case) as within-subject factors and response set (overlap-
ping, non-overlapping) as a between-subjects factor. This
analysis revealed a significant main effect of block, F (1,
38) = 11.15, p \ 0.01, g2 = 0.23, caused by slower
responses on univalent stimuli in the mixed block
(M = 847 ms, SE = 38) than in the purely univalent block
(M = 802 ms, SE = 32). This confirms the presence of the
bivalency effect. The analysis also showed a significant
main effect of task, F (2, 76) = 4.73, p \ 0.05, g2 = 0.11,
and a significant interaction between task and response set,
F (2, 76) = 6.14, p \ 0.01, g2 = 0.14. This reflects a lar-
ger difference between overlapping and non-overlapping
response set conditions for parity decisions (243 ms) than
for case decisions (88 ms) and colour decisions (35 ms).
Consistent with the episodic context account, the three-
way interaction between block, task and response set was
not significant, F (2, 76) = 0.96, p = 0.38, g2 = 0.02
(observed power for the null effect of the interaction was
0.21). Moreover, no other main or interaction effects were
significant, Fs \ 3.29, ps [ 0.05, g2 \ 0.08. The bivalency
effect was present for all three tasks in both response set
conditions. In the overlapping response set condition, it
was 62, 83, and 51 ms for the parity, colour, and case
decisions, respectively. In the non-overlapping response set
condition, it was 25, 17, and 34 ms, for the parity, colour,
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Fig. 2 Experiment 1. Means decision times on trials with univalent
stimuli from the purely univalent block (white bars) and those from
the mixed block (black bars) in both response set conditions. Error
bars represent standard errors. Means are based on median decision
times of correct responses out of 30 trials for all conditions, except for
the case decisions of the mixed block with only 24 trials
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Finally, we also carried out a mixed three-factorial
ANOVA on the accuracy of univalent stimuli. This
ANOVA with block and task as within-subject factors and
response set as a between-subjects factor showed a sig-
nificant main effect of task, F (1.52, 57.75) = 8.83,
p \ 0.01, g2 = 0.19. Thus, participants made more errors
on parity and colour decisions (M = 0.96, SE = 0.01; and
M = 0.96, SE = 0.01, respectively) than on case decisions
(M = 0.98, SE = 0.00). No other main effect or interac-
tion were significant, Fs \ 3.92, ps [ 0.05, g2 \ 0.09.
These results indicate that no speed-accuracy trade-off
compromised the critical DTs effects.
Discussion
The primary goal of Experiment 1 was to test whether the
bivalency effect might result from negative priming of
bivalent stimulus features via the response features.
Therefore, we contrasted task-switching performance on an
overlapping and a non-overlapping response set. The
results showed a performance slowing on all tasks with
univalent stimuli after encountering bivalent stimuli,
demonstrating the presence of the bivalency effect in both
conditions. This suggests that even if bivalent stimulus
features would interfere with the processing of univalent
trials that share relevant response features with the bivalent
stimuli, this negative priming is not sufficient to explain the
bivalency effect. Therefore, the results of Experiment 1 are
in line with the view that the bivalency effect stems from
the interference caused by episodic context binding rather
than being due to negative response set priming.
However, one might argue that the particular set-up of
Experiment 1 with the parity decision on the first position
may have given rise to a restart effect that might have
disguised a potential differential reduction of the bivalency
effect. The restart effect refers to slowed performance on
the first trial in a trial sequence (Allport & Wylie, 2000).
Therefore, we ran a second experiment to replicate and
extend the results from Experiment 1, in which we changed
the order of the tasks such that colour became the first and
parity the second task. With this change, we were able to
make sure that in Experiment 2 any slowing on the parity




The participants were 40 different volunteers (24 men,
mean age = 24.1, SD = 3.4) from the University of Bern.
As in Experiment 1, half of them were randomly assigned
to the overlapping response set condition and the other half
to the non-overlapping response set condition.
Materials
The materials were identical to Experiment 1.
Procedure
The procedure was also identical to Experiment 1, except that
the order of the colour and parity decisions was changed. In
Experiment 2, each trial sequence required a colour decision,
a parity decision, and a case decision, always in the same
order. Participants with an overlapping response set were
instructed to press the keys b or n with their left and right
index fingers, respectively, for each of the three tasks. Par-
ticipants with a non-overlapping response set were instructed
to press the keys b or n with their left and right index fingers,
respectively, for the colour decision; the keys v or m with their
left and right middle fingers, respectively, for the parity
decision; the keys c or , with their left and right ring fingers,
respectively, for the case decision.
Data analysis
The data analysis was identical to Experiment 1.
Results
Performance on bivalent stimuli
Participants made bivalent case decisions more slowly than
univalent case decisions, but this slowing was more pro-
nounced in the overlapping response set condition (Mbivalent =
1,292 ms, SE = 144; Munivalent = 710 ms, SE = 33) than in
the non-overlapping response set condition (Mbivalent =
1,093 ms, SE = 99; Munivalent = 831 ms, SE = 77). This
observation was borne out by a two-factorial ANOVA on the
case DTs from the mixed block. This ANOVA with stimulus
valence (univalent case, bivalent case) as a within-subject
factor and response set (overlapping, non-overlapping) as a
between-subjects factor showed a significant main effect of
stimulus valence, F (1, 38) = 31.39, p \ 0.001, g2 = 0.45,
and a significant interaction between stimulus valence and
response set, F (1, 38) = 4.53, p \ 0.05, g2 = 0.11. The main
effect of response set was not significant, F (1, 38) = 0.12,
p = 0.73, g2 = 0.003.
The same ANOVA on the accuracy of the case decisions
from the mixed block revealed a significant main effect of
stimulus valence, F (1, 38) = 12.93, p \ 0.01, g2 = 0.25.
No other main or interaction effects were significant,
Fs \ 0.08, ps [ 0.05, g2 \ 0.01. Thus, participants made
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more errors on bivalent case decisions than on univalent
case decisions in both response set conditions (overlapping
response set: Mbivalent = 0.92, SE = 0.02; Munivalent = 0.99,
SE \ 0.01; and non-overlapping response set: Mbivalent =
0.93, SE = 0.03; Munivalent = 0.98, SE = 0.01).
Performance on univalent stimuli
Figure 3 depicts the means of the median DTs on univalent
stimuli with the associated standard errors. As in Experi-
ment 1, our main objective was to examine the presence of
the bivalency effect on the different tasks across both
response set conditions. We carried out a mixed three-
factorial ANOVA with block (purely univalent, mixed) and
task (parity, colour, case) as within-subject factors and
response set (overlapping, non-overlapping) as a between-
subjects factor. This analysis revealed a significant main
effect of block, F (1, 38) = 27.96, p \ 0.001, g2 = 0.42,
caused by slower responses on univalent stimuli in the
mixed block (M = 846 ms, SE = 32) than in the purely
univalent block (M = 774 ms, SE = 28). This confirms
the presence of the bivalency effect. The analysis also
showed a significant main effect of task, F (1.70,
64.61) = 15.00, p \ 0.001, g2 = 0.28, and a significant
interaction between task and response set, F (1.70,
64.61) = 3.45, p \ 0.05, g2 = 0.08. This reflects a larger
difference between overlapping and non-overlapping
response set conditions for parity decisions (105 ms) and
case decisions (94 ms) than for colour decisions (-4 ms).
As in Experiment 1, and consistent with an episodic
context binding account, the three-way interaction between
block, task and response set was not significant, F (1.48,
56.11) = 1.41, p = 0.25, g2 = 0.04 (observed power for
the null effect of the interaction was 0.25). No other main
or interaction effects were significant, Fs \ 1.89,
ps [ 0.05, g2 \ 0.05. In the overlapping response set
condition, the bivalency effect was 100, 48, and 38 ms for
the colour, parity, and case decisions, respectively. In the
non-overlapping response set condition, the bivalency
effect was 88, 66, and 93 ms, for the colour, parity, and
case decisions, respectively.
Finally, we also carried out a mixed three-factorial
ANOVA on the accuracy of univalent stimuli. This
ANOVA with block and task as within-subject factors and
response set as a between-subjects factor showed a sig-
nificant main effect of task, F (1.45, 55.19) = 15.80,
p \ 0.001, g2 = 0.29. Thus, participants made more errors
on colour and parity decisions (M = 0.94, SE = 0.01; and
M = 0.96, SE = 0.01, respectively) than on case decisions
(M = 0.99, SE = 0.00). No other main or interaction
effects were significant, Fs \ 1.34, ps [ 0.05, g2 \ 0.03.
These results indicate that no speed-accuracy trade-off
compromised the critical DTs effects.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 replicated those of Experiment
1. They showed a reliable bivalency effect on all three
tasks for both response set conditions. Thus, even when a
potential interaction between the bivalency effect and the
restart effect was controlled, the findings of the present
study revealed a bivalency effect for both response set
conditions. This finding again suggests that the bivalency
effect is rather due to episodic context binding than to
response set priming.
General Discussion
The purpose of the present study was to test whether the
bivalency effect results from negative priming of bivalent
stimulus features via common response features, as sug-
gested by recent findings of priming from response features
to stimulus features (e.g., Fagioli et al., 2007; Metzker &
Dreisbach, 2009) or whether it stems from episodic context
binding (Meier et al., 2009). According to a negative
response features priming account, after bivalent stimuli
are encountered, bivalent stimulus features would interfere
with the processing of univalent trials that share relevant
response features with the bivalent stimuli. Thus, bivalent
stimulus features would be negatively primed over these
trials. This would result in a bivalency effect for the uni-
valent trials that share relevant response features with the
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Fig. 3 Experiment 2. Means decision times on trials with univalent
stimuli from the purely univalent block (white bars) and those from
the mixed block (black bars) in both response set conditions. Error
bars represent standard errors. Means are based on median decision
times of correct responses out of 30 trials for all conditions except for
the case decisions of the mixed block with only 24 trials
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context binding account, univalent stimuli and tasks would
be bound to the context in which bivalent stimuli have been
encountered occasionally. This ‘‘episodic context binding’’
would interfere with processing all subsequent trials, thus
causing a bivalency effect irrespective of the response set
overlap between univalent and bivalent stimuli.
In two experiments, we found a performance slowing on
univalent trials after bivalent stimuli were occasionally pre-
sented. More critically, this slowing—the bivalency effect—
was found independent of whether or not univalent and bivalent
stimuli shared the same response sets. This finding rules out the
possibility that the bivalency effect simply arises from negative
priming of bivalent stimulus features via common response
features (e.g., Fagioli et al., 2007; Metzker & Dreisbach, 2009).
In fact, such an explanation cannot explain why the bivalency
effect was found for tasks with response features different from
those of the bivalent stimuli (i.e., for parity and colour decisions
in the non-overlapping response set)1.
In addition, the present study also replicated the previ-
ous findings (Meier et al., 2009; Woodward et al., 2003;
2008) by showing a similar bivalency effect on tasks with
univalent stimuli sharing relevant stimulus features with
the bivalent stimuli and on those with univalent stimuli
sharing no relevant stimulus features with the bivalent
stimuli. Taken together, the findings of the present study
showed that negative priming accounts operating across
either stimulus or response features are not sufficient to
explain the bivalency effect (cf., Allport et al., 1994; All-
port & Wylie, 1999; 2000; Wylie & Allport, 2000). Fur-
thermore, they suggest that the task-decision process
accounts must be extended in order to explain the biva-
lency effect (cf., Fagot, 1994; Meiran et al., 2008; Monsell
et al., 2000; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Rubinstein, et al.,
2001; Sohn & Anderson, 2001). For instance, using uni-
valent stimuli Braverman and Meiran (2010) provided
evidence for a task-decision process that involves stimulus-
and task-relevant features. Thus, if the task-decision pro-
cess would not only involve stimulus- or task-relevant
features but also context-relevant features i.e., episodic
context binding, then it would be possible to account for
the bivalency effect.
Thus, the results of the present study revealed that the
adjustment of cognitive control involved in the bivalency
effect could not be the result of stimulus priming or of
response priming. This finding is of particular interest for
the current debate in cognitive control research as to
whether the cognitive control effects are related to cogni-
tive control at all, or whether they are the result of priming
processes operating across stimulus or response represen-
tations (see Egner, 2007, for an overview). This debate has
focused on a paradigm that mixes congruent stimuli (i.e.,
stimuli affording the same response) with incongruent
stimuli (i.e., stimuli affording different responses). In these
paradigms, congruency effects (i.e., the performance
slowing on incongruent stimuli relative to congruent
stimuli) are usually smaller after an incongruent stimulus
than after a congruent stimulus. Typically, this sequential
modulation of congruency effects has been interpreted as a
result from an adjustment of cognitive control (e.g.,
Botvinick et al., 2001). According to this account, as an
incongruent stimulus leads to the activation of two
responses, it involves a conflict. In order to overcome this
conflict, an adjustment of cognitive control is required.
Interestingly, this adjustment of cognitive control persists
across the subsequent trial. This facilitates processing when
the stimulus in the subsequent trial is incongruent. In
contrast, when the stimulus in the first trial is congruent,
less cognitive control is necessary and this impairs pro-
cessing when the stimulus in the subsequent trial is
incongruent. Taken together, this explains the sequential
modulation of congruency effects.
1 One could argue that there may still be a potential overlap in the
non-overlapping response set depending on how responses are coded
(see Druey & Hu¨bner, 2008; Hu¨bner & Druey, 2008). For example,
participants in the non-overlapping response set condition might code
responses according to the anatomical features of the finger types or
according to the spatial features of the response keys. Accordingly,
they would have coded the responses according to the three finger
types (i.e., index, middle, ring) or to the spatial features of the
response keys (i.e., left, middle, right). If participants would code
responses according to the three finger types, the index, middle, and
ring fingers for both hands would be mapped to the parity, colour, and
case decisions, respectively, in Experiment 1, and to the colour,
parity, and case decisions, respectively, in Experiment 2. As bivalent
stimuli always appeared in the case decisions, bivalent stimulus
features would be linked to the response features of the ring fingers.
However, they would never be linked to the response features of the
index or middle fingers. As a consequence, even when responses are
coded according to anatomical features of the finger types, the
response set would not overlap between univalent and bivalent stimuli
for the parity and colour decisions.
Alternatively, if participants would code responses according to the
spatial features of the response keys, the response features left,
middle, and right would be mapped in Experiment 1 to the case,
colour, and parity decisions, respectively, for the left hand and to the
parity, colour, and case decisions, respectively, for the right hand.
Similarly, in Experiment 2, the response features left, middle, and
right would be mapped to the case, parity, and colour decisions,
respectively, for the left hand and to the colour, parity, and case
decisions, respectively, for the right hand. In this case, bivalent
stimulus features would be linked to the response features left and
right. Therefore, the response set would overlap between univalent
and bivalent stimuli for the parity and case decisions in Experiment 1
and for the colour and case decisions in Experiment 2. In contrast, it
would never overlap for the colour decision in Experiment 1 and for
the parity decision in Experiment 2 as these tasks were mapped to the
response feature middle. Accordingly, even if participants would have
coded responses according to the spatial features of the response keys,
the response set would still not overlap for at least one of the three
tasks. Therefore, it does not matter how the responses are coded
because for both types of response codes (finger vs. spatial), negative
priming of bivalent stimulus features via common response features
would not be sufficient to account for the present results.
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Recently, however, this sequential modulation is sug-
gested to be mediated by priming effects (e.g., Hommel,
2004; Mayr, Awh, & Laurey, 2003). More precisely, in
congruent trials following congruent trials and in incon-
gruent trials following incongruent trials, all stimulus and
response features are repeated or all features change. Thus,
in complete repetitions, repetition priming might occur and
in complete changes, no negative priming at all might
occur. In both cases, this would result in a performance
benefit. In contrast, in congruent trials following incon-
gruent trials and in incongruent trials following congruent
trials, one feature (stimulus or response) changes and the
others remain the same. Thus, in these partial repetitions,
no repetition priming should occur, whereas negative
priming might occur. In this case, performance should slow
down. However, although this account is consistent with
the sequential modulation of congruency effects, it cannot
entirely explain the findings of the present study that
showed a bivalency effect, irrespective of stimulus or
response priming. Thus, some cognitive control effects,
such as the bivalency effect, might be related to cognitive
control, and others, such as the sequential modulation of
congruency effects, might be the result of priming
processes.
The results of the present study are rather compatible
with the explanation that the adjustment of cognitive
control involved in the bivalency effect reflects the inter-
ference caused by episodic context binding. Based on the
evidence that experiencing a stimulus in a specific task
affects performance (see Waszak et al., 2003), we have
proposed that experiencing stimuli or tasks in a specific
context, such as the more difficult demand of occasionally
encountering bivalent stimuli, can also affect performance
(Meier et al., 2009). In this way, performance results from
episodic binding that involves not only stimuli or tasks but
also the context in which they occur. This notion is con-
sistent with the recent findings from Waszak and Pholu-
lamdeth (2009) who observed that an emotionally arousing
picture modulates the episodic binding between a stimulus
and a task. However, the results of the present study sug-
gest that a context does not even need to be emotionally
arousing to have an impact on performance. It is sufficient
when it triggers specific demands, such as the increased
demands caused by occasionally encountering bivalent
stimuli.
Summing up, the findings of the present study showed
that the bivalency effect was similar when univalent and
bivalent stimuli shared the same response features and
when they did not. Furthermore, it was also similar for
tasks with univalent stimuli sharing relevant stimulus fea-
tures with the bivalent stimuli and for those with univalent
stimuli sharing no relevant stimulus features with the
bivalent stimuli. The adjustment of cognitive control
involved in the bivalency effect, therefore, does not arise
from negative priming of bivalent stimulus features.
Rather, the results support the view that the bivalency
effect reflects the interference caused by episodic context
binding.
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